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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of Andersen reputation on market prices using the event that 
Andersen has admitted shredded documents related to the Enron audit in United States. 
Specifically, in this paper, we extend to the other stock exchange out of United States, 
namely Bursa Malaysia. Is there any contagious impact on Andersen reputation to the Bursa 
Malaysia? Since the admitted announcement shows the issue of independence as the main 
focus in the Andersen case, this study also document the impact of non-audit fees on market 
reaction surrounding the admitted announcements date. Interestingly, the results prevails a 
contagious impact on Andersen's Malaysia office. However, Andersen's Malaysia office 
only suffered a less severe decline compared to Andersen's United States and Houston office. 
In addition, there is no evidence that Andersen's Malaysia questionable. 
Keywords: Auditor Reputation, Auditor Independence, Market Prices 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Studies on auditor reputation have been discussed frequently in the accounting and 
auditing literatures. Such studies attempted to relate the audit reputation with audit 
fees, loan pricing and initial public offering (Palmrose, 1986a; Francis and Simon, 
1987; Simon and Francis, 1988; Betty, 1989; Butterworth and Houghton, 1995; 
Blackwell, et al., 1998; Rose, 1999; Hartini, 2003). In addition, it is assumed that a 
reputable auditor also an independence auditor (De Angelo, 1981 b). Many people 
assume that larger audit firms, especially the Big Five firms, are more credible than 
the non-Big Five firms. Thus, they are presumed to perform more quality works than 
the non-Big Five. This phenomenon pretends to give value added to the wealth of 
companies. 
However, recently the Enron scandal in the United States caused the reputation and 
independence of the Big Five to be questionable. The history event happened when 
the Enron's auditor, Andersen, was heavily criticized for its collapse. After August 
2002, Andersen was barred from conducting and reporting on the audits of SEC- 
registered companies. This is never happens in the history of auditing profession that 
such big firms are denied of its quality in that way. 
The Enron case caused the auditor's reputation severely tarnish to the extent that 
many companies' (Andersen's clients) share prices significantly dropped simply 
because investors loss confidence on the auditor's reports (Chaney and Philipich, 
2002). However, Andersen (also known as Arthur Andersen) was a multinational 
audit firms. The events occurred in the U.S may contagious to other nations. 
Nevertheless, empirical study has to be carried out to confirm such contention. This 
paper attempts to carry out such study. 
2.0 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
An interesting issue in this study is the effect of auditor reputation onto investors' 
decision. In the Enron case, there was empirical evidence that investors reacted 
negatively when they loss confidence on the quality of audit performed by Andersen 
(Chaney and Philipich, 2002). However, whether the decline in reputation observed 
for Andersen may contagious to other audit firms is yet to be determined. Since the 
Andersen's case was broadcasted and debated worldwide, many of its associates in 
other nations have become worried. Thus, the contagious effect is suspected to occur 
in other regions of the world where Andersen's name is associated. 
Since the contagious effect of the Andersen case remains questionable, this study 
investigates such effect using local setting, namely among Malaysian companies 
listed in Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) of 
Main Board and Second Board. 
3.0 THE SIGNIFICANT OF THE STUDY 
Today, auditor reputation has become the focus of many corporations and investors, 
especially those companies that are listed in the stock exchange. Although Malaysia 
never experiences any major audit litigation, this study may provide evidence that 
support the theory of "insurance hypothesis." Under this theory, investors view the 
audit products as including insurance against potential investment losses (Wallace, 
1987; Menon and William, 1994). Auditors provide insurance to investors against 
losses sustained by their reliance on potentially inaccurate financial statement 
information. Should the results of this study are in congruence with what has been 
expected, and then the existing theory on "insurance hypothesis" is expanded to 
include the contagious effect of auditor reputation. This is a contribution to 
knowledge. 
This study may also provide some useful insights to the policy maker. The utmost 
concern of the authority is the interests of investors. The interests of the local 
investors need to be protected whenever events of audit scandals occur abroad and has 
no connection with the local market. Thus, authority may want to produce some kind 
of guidelines or rules and regulations that may curb the unnecessary market reaction 
over events that occurred abroad. 
4.0 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The basic question in this study is to investigate the auditor reputation in Malaysia. 
For that reasons, the research questions are: 
1. Does the auditor reputation affect the market prices? 
2. Is there any contagious effect of auditor reputation of Andersen in United 
States to its branch in Malaysia? 
3. Is there any impact of auditor independence to the market prices of their 
clients? 
5.0 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STLTDY 
To date, there is no study published on the effect of audit quality of bankruptcy audit 
firm on market prices in Malaysia. However, there is a study regarding IPO market 
and audit quality (Hartini, 2003). Thus, the objectives of this study are: 
1. To examine whether auditor reputation affect the market prices. 
2. To examine whether there is any contagious effect of auditor reputation 
namely Andersen in United States to its branch in Malaysia. 
3. To examine the effect of auditor independence to the market prices. 
6.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are a number of previous studies that addressed the issue of audit quality for 
large audit firms. It is suggested that large audit firms produce higher audit quality 
than the smaller audit firms (Lennox, 1999). Such qualities are recognized as market 
react positively when a company switches to a larger audit firms from a smaller one 
(Nicholas and Smith, 1983). Also, studies by Reed, Trombley, and Dhaliwal (2000) 
found that Laventhol & Honvarth clients that selected Big Six auditors tended to be 
more highly leverage, have less management ownership, and issue more securities in 
the year after selecting the new auditor compared to L&H clients that selected non- 
Big Six auditors. Therefore it is assumed that the highly risks clients hired Big Six 
auditors in which presume as a reputable auditors, because they have to reduce those 
risks. 
In addition, it was found that only 3% of the clients of Big Six firms, compared to 
5.1 % of smaller auditors' clients were involved in auditor lawsuits (Palrnrose, 1988). 
She also found that on average, assurance level of Big Six auditors were 97% 
compared to those smaller auditors with only 95% assurance. In this study, she used 
472 United States legal cases involving publicly held client-companies during 1960- 
1985. This result shows that Big Firm auditors are more competence in doing their 
audit and subsequently presumed to have higher reputation than the non Big Firm 
auditors. 
However, this is not true when there are phenomenon occurred such as auditor 
bankruptcy and audit failure (Menon and William, 1994; and Chaney and Philipich, 
2002). Therefore, this research focuses on two aspects regarding the impact of 
auditor reputation because such phenomenon rarely studied. First is to examine 
whether there is any contagious impact of Andersen's reputation to the Andersen's 
clients in Malaysia on market prices. Second. is to investigate the effect of non-audit 
services on market prices. 
Menon and Williams (1994) found that the disclosure of L&H's bankruptcy had an 
adverse effect on market prices of L&H clients. He used seasoned securities and 
initial public offering (IPO) loss as the determinant of Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR). In addition, Green and Dawkins (2000) found that there was negative 
association between bankruptcy outcome and price reaction to bankruptcy filings. 
Similarly, Moreland (1995) in his study of the effects of SEC criticisms (sanctions) of 
auditors on earning response coefficients (ERC) of client firms, found that abnormal 
security returns is negatively affected by earning prices. This is also supported by 
study by Firth (1 990) who found that United Kingdom of Trade (DOT) investigations 
into the affairs of a specific company and their criticism on the auditors appear to 
incur economic losses from the damage of their reputations. 
Moreover, Franz, Crawford and Johnson (1998) suggested that the market interprets 
litigation against an audit firm as a signal of decreased in auditor reputation. They 
found that the market places a value on auditor reputation. It is also evidence that 
market react more negatively to the auditor reputation than the client's bankruptcy. 
Clients who were not involve in the litigation, however, experience significant 
negative returns when there is announcement of litigation against their audit firm. 
Moreover, in the case of Enron, events directly related to Andersen had a larger 
(negative) impact on stock returns than events directly related to Enron (Callen and 
Morel, 2002). 
A further study by Chaney and Philipich (2002) using Andersen's client shows that 
the cost of audit failure would affect and impaired audit reputation. The results show 
that on the three following days after Andersen's admission of a significant number of 
documents had been shredded; the Andersen's clients experienced a statistically 
negative market reaction. This suggested that investors downgraded the quality of 
audits performed by Andersen (Chaney and Philipich, 2002). Besides, they also 
found that the clients whose audit was performed by Andersen's Houston office 
suffered a more severe decline in abnormal returns on this date. Similarly 
Krishnamurthy, Zhou and Zhou (2002) found that the deterioration of Andersen's 
reputation was the worse after its criminal indictment on March 14, 2002 caused the 
market to react more negatively to Andersen clients than to clients of the other Big 
Four auditors. 
Besides concentrating and analyzing the effect of auditor reputation on market 
reaction of Andersen's clients, Chaney and Philipich (2002); Krishnamurthy et al. 
(2002) studied on the impact of non-audit services to the market prices. It is 
presumed that market react negatively to the larger non-audit services purchased by 
Andersen's clients, which show that the auditor independence is impaired (Chaney 
and Philipich, 2002; and Krishnamurthy et al., 2002). However the results are mixed. 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2002) found that the abnormal return is significantly higher 
when auditor independence is perceived to be high. This is contrast to Chaney and 
Philipich (2002). The reason why this happens is because Krishnamurthy et al. (2002) 
used the date of Andersen criminal indictment on March 14, 2002 while Chaney and 
Philipich (2002) focused on the date of Andersen's admission that a significant 
number of documents had been shredded. Also, Chaney and Philipich (2002) uses 
sample which consisted relatively larger firms, whereas Krishnamurthy et al. (2002) 
sample consisted of many smaller firms. However, in general, both studies confirm 
that Andersen reputation was declined even different dates were used in their analysis. 
Therefore in this study, the date of Andersen's admission that a significant number of 
documents had been shredded will be analyze using the regression analyses to ensure 
that the results can be concluded clearly. 
6.1 The Extent ofAuditor Reputation's Studies in Malaysia 
Study on auditor reputation in Malaysia began as early as 1990s. However, 
most of the studies used the 'audit quality' term. In addition, no studies 
differentiate between both terms. In the present study, the auditor reputation's 
term is emphasized. According to Simon et al. (1992) the audit quality in 
Malaysian's Public Listed Companies (PLCs) is lower than Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Two reasons were suggested. First because of different national 
regulatory environment existed in Malaysia that limited the involvement of 
international investors. This might be due to the fact that Malaysia is a 
developing nation while Hong Kong and Singapore are categorized as 
developed nations. The regulations are not welcome the investors to invest in 
Malaysia. Therefore, the auditors are not given their best quality in auditing 
their clients as they are all local companies. Second was due to the fact that 
most of the PLCs are family-owned, therefore there is less needed to 
differentiate the quality services acquired from the auditors. It was presumed 
that their shareholders could easily get any information to reduce the agency 
cost. As a result, there is no need for Big Five firms. 
However, lately, the shareholders are becoming emphasized on the audit 
quality of the auditors and more foreign companies have invested in Malaysia. 
Study by Rose (1999) shows that multinational firms paid higher audit fees 
than local firms. Similarly, Ayoib (2001) found that local Chinese controlled 
andlor owned companies paid less for audits as compared with foreign owned 
companies. Besides PLCs, Rohami (2003) also found that foreign banks are 
paid more on audit fees than local banks. Audit fees used as a proxy of 
auditor reputation. These three previous studies confirmed Eichenseher (1 995) 
study in which the Big Six firms were found to have more involve with 
foreign-owned firms than non-Big Six firms. 
Hartini (2003) found that Big Five audit firms are perceived to be more 
reliable by investors since they have a significant effect on the market 
valuation of Initial Public Offering (IPO). Her study is consistent with Datar 
et al. (1991) that suggested a positive relationship between audit quality and 
the market valuation of IPO. Thus, she contended that in Malaysia, investors 
do recognise the audit quality and giving them a signaling mechanism for 
decision making (Hartini, 2003). 
Interestingly, there was an increasing rate of the market share among Big Six 
audit firms from 1991 to 1996, which shows that the Big Six audit firms 
dominated about 65% market share in 1996 and only 58.7% in 1991 in Public 
Listed Companies (PLCs). On the other hand, the non-Big Six dominated less 
as the market share decrease from 41.3% in 1991 to only 34.9% in 1996 
(Takiah et al., 2000). This indicates that the companies are more concern to 
hire the auditors based on the audit quality. 
Even though there were studies on auditor reputation in Malaysia, which 
discussed above, yet there is no studies related to the impact of auditor 
reputation on market prices were carried out. 
6.2 The Extent of Non-audit Services's Studies in Malaysia 
Similarly, to date, there is no study that examines the effect of non-audit 
services on market prices in Malaysia. However, there were a number of 
studies carried out that related to the effect of non-audit fees on audit fees 
(refer to Mohd Atef and Ayoib, 2000; Ayoib, 2001; Rohami, 2003; Ayoib, 
Rohami and Norzalina, 2004). This adds to motivation to conduct this 
research. 
The results of the above studies suggested that market has a high degree of insight 
into the auditor reputation. 
7.0 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The role of an auditor is to monitor a company. The monitoring mechanism is to 
ensure that managers act in accordance with owners' interests or to reduce agency 
costs such as increasing rate of managers' honest reporting and reduce the auditing 
demand by the owner (Chow, 1982; and Finley, Hopwood and Tucker, 1999). In 
addition, the reputation effect of an auditor will control the opportunistic value- 
reducing behaviour of the managers (Fama, 1980). This would happen in efficient 
competitive market (Fama, 1980). Thus, such reputation will protect the share price 
by adjusting the share prices accordingly (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In fact, the 
managers demand such quality of auditor to signal their honesty to the market (Jensen 
and Meclling, 1976). Subsequently, the last resort is to protect the shareholder 
interest. However, when an audit firm is in the case of uncertainty such as bankruptcy 
or lawsuits, the companies will together bear this uncertainty. As suggested by 
Menon and Williams (1994), this situation will lead to future monitoring uncertainty 
and the prospect of a delay in the filing of audited financial statements. Both may 
create possible losses to the companies such as negative reaction of stock prices. 
In light of the Andersen's Malaysia case, the negative market reaction might not be 
seen before the announcement of Enron's bankruptcy because probably investors in 
Malaysia still did not know this news. In fact, the contagious effect would not happen 
before a bad news is announced. The brand name of Andersen was tarnished around 
the world after Andersen admitted shredded the Enron's documents. Later, such 
brand name has not been used outside the United States after Andersen United States 
was barred from auditing the companies. They then tried to find other Big Four for 
merging and building a reputable brand name. The brand name and audit quality 
represent the reputation of the auditor and is the most important feature of an audit 
firm (Dopuch and Simunic, 1982). A repetition story of Andersen failure in the news 
and press worldwide may also portray an eroded reputation because an action was 
called to be taken to the Andersen by outsiders such as Securities Commission and 
public (Peursem and Hauriasi, 1999). We argue that it may results the investors 
outside United States to pull out the investment in Andersen clients. 
Evidence shows that deterioration in the audit quality of Andersen occurred no later 
than mid-1990s compared to other Big-Five (Fuerman, 2003). What would happen 
that Andersen could not protect their liability from any legal regime in the world 
when the consequence of audit quality and audit failure were severe after they 
admitted shredded the documents even though Andersen was assumed providing a 
high audit quality to their clients (Kadous, 2000). Again, we expect that the Andersen 
United States reputation will also effect the reputation of Andersen worldwide 
specifically Andersen Malaysia, hence, reflecting negatively in the share prices of its 
clients. 
Study by Callen and Morel (2002) proved that events directly related to Andersen had 
a larger (negative) impact on stock returns than events directly related to Enron. 
Therefore, in the case of events directly related to Andersen, it is expected that a 
negative reaction will be prevailed. In this present study, one event directly related to 
Andersen' United States that might be effect other Andersen around the world 
including Malaysia is studied. The date is the announcement of shredding documents, 
which Andersen had admitted on Jan 10, 2002. This announcement is the bad news 
to Andersen's clients. Event on Jan 10, 2002 was unexpected and was met with shock 
in the business community due to the fact that normally when audit firms paid 
damages to lawsuit claimants or penalties to the SEC, they are careful not to admit 
guilt (Chaney and Philipich, 2002). Subsequently, this will tarnish the Andersen 
reputation. As a result of the bad news, the Andersen's clients also effected. It is 
argued that the contagious impact will happen in Malaysia due to the fact that 
Malaysia is an open market nation and Andersen established its branch over here. 
However, the contagious impact would not spread to other Big Four because it only 
involved Andersen's reputation (Krishnamurthy et al., 2002). Therefore the 
following hypotheses are derived as follows (in alternate form): 
Hla  : Andersen's clients in Malaysia will experience a negative market reaction to 
the announcement of news that Andersen admitted shredded documents 
related to the Enron audit, is made public. 
Hlb : Andersen's clients in Malaysia will experience a negative market reaction 
to the announcement of news that reflects negatively on the Andersen's 
reputation. 
In addition, the negative abnormal returns could be driven by the Andersen 
independence. It is argued that audit firms provided other services rather the audits 
to some extend impair their independence. In the Andersen's case, the event that 
Andersen admitted shredded documents related to the Enron audit are likely impaired 
Andersen independence. This will be more prominent if Andersen perform more on 
other services rather than audit services. As the consequences, the reliability and 
validity of Andersen audit of their companies could be denied and questionable. 
Investors will belief that Andersen did not give the best opinion as "true and fair 
view" to their clients. Thus, the negative abnormal return would be larger if the 
auditor independence perceived to be impaired. 
H2 : There is a positive relationship between audit fee ratio and abnormal return 
for events that perceived Andersen not to be independence. 
Consistent with the measurement used by Krishnamurthy et al. (2002), the 
measurement of Andersen independence is the ratio of audit fees to total fees. The 
reason this measurement is used because low audit fee ratio shows that the auditors 
provide large amounts of non-audit services, and therefore perceived to be not 
independent (Krishnamurthy et al. 2002). 
8.0 RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
8.1 Sample and Data 
The sample comprised of all Andersen's clients in Malaysia in the year of 
2000 and the clients must maintain engagement with Andersen until 2002. 
Total sample is 101 companies. For descriptive analysis, the date that 
Andersen admitted shredding the documents on January 10,2002 is used. Ten 
trading days on stock prices of Bursa Malaysia (Main and Second board) are 
gathered (see Menon and Williams 1994). 
8.2 Explanations of the Model 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) pioneered the event study. Later, in 
1980s, the researchers introduced the cross sectional studies using abnormal 
returns and firm specific variables of size and leverage (see Leftwich, 1981 
and Jain, 1982). Thus, this study replicates the established model of 
cumulative abnormal return from previous studies in market reaction of audit 
quality that is used worldwide in auditing literature (see for example, Menon 
and Williams, 1994; Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Krishnamurthy et al., 2002 
in the United States; and in Asia, Gul, Sun and Tsui, 2003) and extended to 
accommodate the Malaysian environment. Several variables such as size and 
risk are control in the Ordinary Least Squares regressions, in which possible to 
influence market returns (see for example Menon and Williams, 1994; Chaney 
and Philipich, 2002; and Krishnamurthy et al., 2002 in the United States; and 
in Asia Gul, Sun and Tsui, 2003). Both variables are well specified in the 
model (Leftwich, 1981). Size and risk are proxied by the natural log of total 
assets and debtltotal assets ratio (debt ratio). Size and risk provide a simple 
and powerful characterization of abnormal return in finance literature (Banz, 
198 1 ; and Fama and French, 1992). Both variables are powerful variables to 
explain Cumulative Average Return (CARS). Other variables ;sales growth 
(SALESGROW), Andersen (AA) and financial year-end (FYR) are most 
likely to attribute the price movements within the window period, thus, affect 
the market return (Menon and Williams, 1994; Chaney and Philipich, 2002; 
and Krishnamurthy et al., 2002 in the United States; and in Asia Gul, Sun and 
Tsui, 2003). Below are the detailed explanations of each variable that likely 
attribute the price movements within the window period, which may attribute 
to the contagious effects. 
This study uses one sample t-test and the regression analysis (OLS) to analyze 
the data. The research models are as follows: 
Andersen admitted shredding documents 
CAR = a + fllFEERATIO + f12LOGASSETS +f13SALESGROW + 
f14LEV+ f15AA + f16FYR+ e 
where, 
CAR= The Cumulative Mean Abnormal Return for Andersen client 
over the two, three and five days around admitted of shredding 
documents by Andersen. 
CAR 
where, 
ARit = Abnormal Return 
Rit = Observed return on security I 
R,, = Return on the KLSE Composite Index (KLCI) for the t th period 
a = Intercept 
fli = Beta for fm I' 
FEERATIO = The ratio of audit fee to total fees paid to Andersen 
LOGASSETS = Loglo of total assets 
SALESGROW = Percentage growth in sales from 19999-2000 
LEV = The ratio of long-term debt plus short-term debt to total assets 
AA = Indicator variable having a value of 1, if the name of auditor is 
Andersen and 0, if Hanafiah Raslan Mohamad 
FYR = Indicator variable having a value of 1, if the fiscal year-end 
between December 3 1 and January 3 1, and 0, if otherwise 
a = constant (i = 0) 
fl = Coefficients= i - 172737475 
8.3 Definition 
8.3.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
CAR is the dependent variable. CAR is measured by the total of 
difference between return for client and return on the value-weighted 
Composite Index of Bursa Malaysia (the expected return). 
8.3.2 Audit Fee Ratios 
This is the first hypothesis variable, which defined as the total audit fee 
to total fees paid to Andersen. The objective to include this variable is 
to see whether the auditor independence affect the market return. Both 
Chaney and Philipich (2002); and Krishnamurthy et al. (2002) 
predicted a positive relationship between audit fee ratios and market 
return if the auditor independence is perceived to be impaired by 
investors. The Company Act 1965 required every company to disclose 
the amount of audit fees paid to their auditors in the annual reports. 
Audit fees are measured by the dollar value of audit fees paid by the 
companies to the Andersen. The total fees are the total of audit fees 
plus non-audit fees Beginning 1 June 2001, the companies listed in 
Bursa Malaysia are required to disclose the amount of non-audit fees. 
8.3.3 Assets 
This variable is defined as total assets. One effect that the size variable 
should pick up is the increase in audit costs, given that previous studies 
shows that audit fees are a function of size (Menon and Williams, 
1994). This will lead to the negative relationship between size and 
return. The market may react negatively to the large clients of 
Andersen because they downgraded the audit quality of Andersen 
1 Betas were estimated using a 100-day estimation period that ended December 3 1, 200 1 (refer to Menon and 
Williams, 1994). Composite Index of Bursa Malaysia was used to compute market returns. 
when audit the large clients in Bursa Malaysia. This may due to the 
market sentiments in Bursa Malaysia (Noor and Wan, 2004). In 
addition, large Andersen clients are often viewed as having the ability 
and the incentive to manage earnings, more complex, less transparent, 
thus the market may discount the quality of their reports (Chaney and 
Philipich, 2002). Similarly, large clients also have a large information 
asymmetry between managers and investors when market participants 
generate and disseminate less predisclosure information of the 
companies (Ho, Liu and Ramanan, 1997). In fact, the negative relation 
between size and market return is robust in various finance literature 
such as Banz (1981); and Fama and French (1992). This is confirmed 
by Gul et al. (2003). However, it will not prevail due to size surrogate 
for other effect as well (Menon and Williams, 1994). For example, 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2002) found no relationship between size and 
return. 
8.3.4 Sales Growth 
This is one of the control variables, which defined as percentage 
growth in sales from 1999-2000. Sales growth is between 1999 and 
2000 used to capture potential aggressive revenue recognition 
procedures by companies (Chaney and Philipich, 2002). Sales growth 
is an indicator of future profitability. The announcement of Andersen 
audit failure by themselves shows that unclear reliability of the 
financial statements audited by Andersen. Hence, the investors will 
react negatively when Andersen clients sales growth increase 
dramatically because it can be said that the financial statement audited 
by Andersen were not reliable due to the audit failure of Andersen. 
Investors may assume that Andersen did not control the earning 
managements of their clients. In addition, the market will downgrade 
Andersen clients with high growth in sales because these companies 
might be using aggressive revenue-recognition strategies that could not 
be sustained in the future (Chaney and Philipich, 2002). Moreover, in 
general, the managers have an incentive to be bias and distort the 
figures for their self interest. Hence, this would not resolve if low 
quality auditor audited the figures (Healy and Palepu, 1993). Andersen 
may not increase the credibility of financial statements by verifying the 
management estimation. But, what would happen is that, the 
information asymmetry would be greater between managers and 
investors. This will lead to the negative relationship between sales 
growth and return. Chaney and Philipich (2002) found a significant 
negatively relationship between this two variables. However, 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2002) found no significant relationship between 
sales growth and return although the sign was negative. 
8.3.5 Leverage 
The other control variable is leverage. It is argued that firms with high 
leverage may be more likely to use inadequately disclosed off- balance 
sheet transactions that may hide the firm's true financial condition 
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2002). Also, a high leverage will cause the 
market judges the prospects of Andersen clients to be poor (Fama and 
French, 1992). Thus, market will react negatively with Andersen 
clients with high leverage. For example, Gul et al. (2003) found a 
statistically significant negative relationship between CARS and 
leverage. Therefore it assumed that a larger negative reaction would 
be seen for companies that have higher leverage than lower leverage. 
8.3.6 AA 
Since 1990, Andersen worldwide was team up with the first and largest 
local audit firm in Malaysia namely Hanafiah Raslan Mohamad. The 
purpose of the team was to use the name of Andersen in the global 
market. However, there are clients who like to use local brand name of 
Hanafiah Raslan Mohamed. Thus, it may provide different effect on 
market prices. Due to the Andersen reputation tarnish in the global 
market, the effect will be more severe when the clients using the 
Andersen's name compare to local brand name. For example, Gul et 
al. (2003) found that market responds positively to the companies that 
audited by well-established auditor with high reputation. Hence, the 
market is expected to react negatively with Andersen reputation 
compare to local brand name. 
8.3.7 Financial Year-End (FYR) 
Financial year-end controls for monitoring uncertainties resulting from 
the possibility of lengthy delays before audited statements for the 
period were issued (Menon and Williams, 1994). Besides, the 
financial year-end controls the uncertainty of clients that just ended 
their fiscal year before audited by Andersen. The investors will react 
negatively for the clients that have fiscal year end within the event date 
of Andersen admitted shredded the document. This might be because 
the market judges these clients as poor company in the sense that their 
financial statements will be audited by low reputation auditor. 
Therefore, FYR is expected to have a negative relationship with CAR. 
9.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
9.1 Descriptive Analyses 
Table 1 shows that how the sample is gathered. As suggested by Menon and 
Williams (1994), the companies must meet all the following criteria; first, the 
companies should have stock return data. Second, additional data in the 
analyses should be available; third, the trading price should at least RM0.25. 
Lastly, the companies should not make a dividend or earnings announcement 
on the ten trading days. 
In addition, all Practice Note 4 companies are eliminated to ensure no 
compounded effect and also meet the Menon and Williams (1994) 
requirements. After eliminating all insufficient samples, the total sample is 
101 companies. These companies are used to see the abnormal return and 
cumulative abnormal return (refer to Table 2). Out of 101 companies, only 54 
companies that disclosed non-audit fees (include companies that did not 
purchase non-audit services). Thus, the companies that disclose non-audit 
fees are used in the regression analyses. 
Table 1: Sample Selection: Andersen's clients in Bursa Malaysia 
Total Andersen's Clients 
Less 
Delisting companies 
Practice Note 4 companies 
Earning Announcement 
Dividend Announcement 
No Return Data 
No Annual Report 
Trading price below RM0.25 
Total Sample 
Companies that purchased Non-Audit Services (NAS) 
Companies that did not purchase NAS and disclose it in 
the annual reports 
Total Sample for regression analyses 
Companies that are silent on NAS (assumed did not 
purchase NAS) 
Total sample 
Table 2 shows daily excess returns for Andersen over the ten days surrounding 
the admitted announcement, which is, three trading days preceding the event 
window and five trading days after it. Overall, it can be said that, the 
Andersen's clients stock prices react negatively a day after January 10, which 
is starting from January 11 until January 16 (weak significantly different from 
zero at 0.1 level, two-tailed test). The reason might be due to the fact that the 
news only contagious a day after the admitted announcement. Also, it might 
due to different time. 
Table 3 confirms that CARs for Andersen clients are significantly negative for 
two and three event windows. However, both abnormal returns and CARs are 
less severe compare to Andersen's counterpart in United States and Houston 
(see Chaney and Philipich, 2002). For example, on January 11 average 
abnormal returns for Andersen's clients in Malaysia are only -.3547 % 
compare to Andersen's clients in United States with -0.78%. Similarly, in 
Malaysia, CAR for two event windows (0, +1) is only -.7043%, while United 
States and Houston office are -1.17% and -3.16% respectively. Again, it is 
shows that Andersen's Malaysia office is less severe decline on this date. 
Overall, the results from Table 2 and Table 3 support Hypothesis 1 ( l a  and 
1 b). 
Table 2: Effect of Andersen Admitted Announcement of Shredded 
Documents on Security Prices of Andersen Clients in Malaysia-Abnormal 
Returns for Ten days Around Disclosure Period 
1 Date I Average Abnormal Return (%) 1 t-test I 
I I 
1 Jan 14 1 -0.3674 1 -1.730* 1 
I I 
-1.593 Jan 7 -0.3366 
- 1.493 Jan 9 
I I 
* Significant at 10% (2-tailed) 
-0.3 148 
I I 
Table 3: Effect of Andersen Admitted Announcement of Shredded 
Documents on Security Prices of Andersen Clients in Malaysia- 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARS) 
-1.704* Jan 15 -0.3609 
-1.654 Jan 17 
* Significant at 10% (2-tailed) 
-0.3506 







Before using multivariate regression analyses, an analysis on multicollinerity 
was done. Table 4 shows that only LEV and LOGASSETS is positively 
associated at 0.01 levels. However, the coefficient between both variables is 
still acceptable (0.518). To ensure the multicollinerity does not pose serious 
problem to the multivariate regression analyses, variance inflation factors 
(VIF) are computed. Evidence exhibits that VIF are under 2. Therefore, it 
indicates that the multivariate regression analyses can be used to test the 
Hypothesis 2 with minimal multicollinerity problems 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (%) 
-.7043 
-1.0717 
The purpose to use the mutivariate regression analyses is to test Hypothesis 2. 
If Hypothesis 2 is true, the issues of auditor independence, specifically 
Andersen's Malaysia must be worried. However, the results from Table 5 do 
not support Hrpothesis 2 for both event windows (two-day-window and three- 
day window). FEERATIO is insignificant although the sign is positive as 
expected. 
The coefficients for other variables are in the expected directions. However, 
only two variables are significant. AA and FYR have significantly negative 
associated to CARS at 0.05 levels (two-tailed test). AA is introduced in the 
analyses because Andersen was team up with the largest local audit firm of 
Hanafiah Raslan Mohamad (HRM). The market of audit firm in Malaysia is 
unique because most of the Big Five team up with local audit firm. Therefore, 
it is assumed that Andersen is more reputable compared to HRM but not after 
the shredded document scandal. This might due to the fact that international 
investors foresee the Andersen quality downgraded after the admitted 
announcement of shredded document by Andersen. The negative coefficient 
confirms this contention. The variable FYR has a significantly negative 
coefficient and consistent with Menon Menon and Williams (1994). 
The regression analysis of the two-day window does not much different with 
the three-day window. Adjusted R~ for both event windows are 0.129 and 
0.129, respectively, which is comparable with other studies (refer to Menon 
and Williams, 1994; Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Krishnamurthy et al., 2002). 
Besides, both models are significant at 0.049 and 0.051. Further tests are also 
employed and the results still hold.2 
The results should be interpreted cautiously due to the fact that the declining 
share prices of Andersen's clients might not be solely necessarily because of 
the event involved with the shredded reputation of Andersen in United States. 
The results might be clearer if we include non-Andersen clients as a control 
sample. However, due to unavoidable constraints, an analysis on the non- 
Andersen clients could not be conducted. 
There are two kinds of results that will be revealed for non-Andersen clients. 
First if the abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return for their clients 
are not significant, it shows clearly about the contagious effect. However, if 
the results are significant and similar with Andersen's clients, it shows that it 
is congruent with the efficient market hypothesis. Evidence reveals that the 
investors in Malaysia market follow the market sentiments (Noor and Wan, 
2004). Thus, this gives a significant impact on non-Andersen clients because 
of the investors are so panic about the event happened in United States and the 
heavily criticisms on the audit quality of auditors including Big Five firms 
after the scandal involved Andersen. 
Although the research design does have such constraints, this study still 
provides some empirical evidence on insurance hypothesis theory using the 
The non-audit fees ratios are used to replace audit fees ratios and the results still similar. 
stock prices. In fact, contagious effects can be expanded to other countries. 
There is some evidence shows that Andersen Malaysia reputation also affected 
by the shredded reputation of Andersen US. But, in the case of Andersen 
Malaysia independence, there is no evidence that investors react negatively 
when Andersen Malaysia providing large non-audit services to their clients. 





























*** Correlation is significant at 1% (two-tailed). 
Table 5: Effect of Andersen Admitted Announcement of Shredded 
Documents on Security Prices of Andersen Clients in Malaysia- 
Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARS), N=54 
Variables 1 Expected 1 Two-day window I Three-day window I 
FEERATIO + .I23 0.924 .I22 0.918 
LOGASSETS 
SALESGROW 






FEERATIO = The ratio of audit fee to total fees paid to Andersen 
LOGASSETS = Loglo of total assets 
SALESGROW = Percentage growth in sales from 19999-2000 
LEV = The ratio of long-term debt plus short-term debt to total 
assets 
AA = Indicator variable having a value of 1, if the name of 
auditor is Andersen and 0, if Hanafiah Raslan Mohamad 
FYR = Indicator variable having a value of 1, if the fiscal year-end 
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10.0 IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study supports the cost of audit failure of Andersen to it clients, which is not 
only occurred in the United States but also contagious to the other markets. In the 
global world, the effect might also contagious to the other stock exchanges due to the 
fact that Andersen was an international audit firms and involved with worldwide 
businesses. Thus, Andersen7s clients in Malaysia also react negatively with the issue 
of independence in the United States. In addition, this study supports insurance 
hypothesis as the investors viewed the auditors as guarantors of financial statements 
(Menon and Williams, 1994). 
Some implications should be emphasized. The interests of the local investors need to 
be protected whenever event of audit scandals occur abroad and has no connection 
with the local market. Thus, policy makers should take a drastic step to ensure the 
independence of audit f m s  in Malaysia are not compromised because the investors 
have to bear the risk if the auditor independence is impaired. In fact, the audit firms 
themselves must take an action to ensure their independence. This study also gives 
opportunity to the researchers in different countries to investigate the effect of 
Andersen reputation on Andersen clients7 stock prices. This study provides an initial 
step to researchers in Malaysia to examine the auditor reputation using the market 
prices. 
These findings are subject to several limitations. First, in terms of method, only one 
method was employed (one sample t-test). Results might be different if other 
methods such as corrected version of the Z-test. Second, the results for both abnormal 
return and cumulative abnormal return are weak with significant level at only 10%. 
Lastly, this study does not control non-Andersen clients due to unavoidable 
constraints. Future research should emphasize and include this in the analysis, to 
ensure the clearer picture about the auditor reputation on market prices. However, it 
still can be concluded that Andersen's clients in Malaysia office suffered a decline of 
stock prices, but less severe compared to Andersen7s United States and Houston 
office. 
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